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This is a preprint of a paper to appear in Philosophical Studies. 
  
Schaffer on Laws of Nature 
Alastair Wilson 
University of Birmingham & Monash University 
email: a.j.wilson@bham.ac.uk 
ABSTRACT 
In ’Quiddistic Knowledge’ (Schaffer [2005]), Jonathan Schaffer argued 
influentially against the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically 
necessary. In this reply I aim to show how a coherent and well-motivated 
form of necessitarianism can withstand his critique. Modal necessitarianism 
-- the view that the actual laws are the laws of all possible worlds -- can do 
justice to some intuitive motivations for necessitarianism, and it has the 
resources to respond to all of Schaffer’s objections. It also has certain 
advantages over contingentism in the domain of modal epistemology. I 
conclude that necessitarianism about laws remains a live option. 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Modal Necessitarianism 
3. Motivating Modal Necessitarianism 
4. Defending Modal Necessitarianism 
5. Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
In ‘Quiddistic Knowledge’ (Schaffer [2005]) Jonathan Schaffer argues that 
the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary has no good 
motivation; that it is subject to devastating objections; and that it ‘dissolves, on 
inspection, into an incoherent heap’1 because the (anyway bad) motivations for it 
pull in different directions. In this paper I aim to show how a coherent and well-
motivated form of necessitarianism can withstand his objections. 
 
I don’t dispute that some forms of necessitarianism are indeed subject to 
Schaffer’s criticisms. And Schaffer is certainly right that the various forms have not 
                                            
1  Schaffer [2005] p.13. 
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always been clearly distinguished. Nonetheless, I think that a coherent 
necessitarianism about laws is possible, and that it has certain theoretical 
advantages over contingentism. My strategy is to elaborate and motivate one 
particular necessitarian picture, and to show how it emerges unscathed from 
Schaffer’s objections.  
 
Roadmap: Section 2 describes my preferred form of necessitarianism, and 
sets aside some potential complications. Section 3 discusses Schaffer’s critique of 
certain motivations for necessitarianism, and Section 4 responds to his direct 
arguments against the view. Section 5 is a conclusion. 
2 Modal Necessitarianism 
Schaffer distinguishes three different forms of necessitarianism: 
 
Modal necessitarianism: The actual laws are the laws of all possible worlds. 
 
Nomic necessitarianism:  Properties are governed by the same laws in all 
worlds in which they are instantiated. 
 
Causal necessitarianism: Properties have the same causal roles in all worlds 
in which they are instantiated. 
 
While modal necessitarianism is clearly a view about laws, nomic 
necessitarianism and causal necessitarianism look like views about the individuation 
of properties. They say, respectively, that properties are individuated by their 
nomic roles and by their causal roles. Nomic necessitarianism and causal 
necessitarianism have had their defenders – for example, Shoemaker [1980, 1998], 
Swoyer [1982], Fales [1993], and Ellis & Lierse [1994]. But here my primary concern 
is with the modal status of laws rather than with the individuation of properties. 
My aim is to set out a plausible picture incorporating modal necessitarianism and 
to defend it against Schaffer’s objections. 
 
For simplicity, I will be assuming that actual laws govern only actually 
instantiated (fundamental determinable2) properties. If we were instead to allow 
that properties can exist uninstantiated while still being governed by the actual 
                                            
2 Non-fundamental properties (like being a river of beer) and determinate properties 
(like having a mass of exactly 2100 kg) raise interesting complications which are mostly 
orthogonal to the question of the modal status of laws. I will set them aside. 
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laws, Schaffer’s formulation of modal necessitarianism would be rendered consistent 
with the possibility of all sorts of processes that we typically think of as anomalous. 
Consider schmass, an ‘alien’ fundamental determinable property which resembles 
mass except that the attractive force between two schmassy objects varies with the 
inverse cube of the distances between them3. If the laws of the actual world govern 
uninstantiated fundamental properties such as schmass, for example by determining 
that schmasses would attract according to an inverse-cube law were any to exist, 
then the characterization of modal necessitarianism given by Schaffer is 
straightforwardly compatible with the metaphysical possibility of schmassy 
behaviour. 
 
This compatibility was unintended4, and it obscures the most interesting 
issues at stake. The central arguments of Schaffer’s paper turn on whether we need 
particular types of possible world to play particular theoretical roles; so it is crucial 
to the dialectic that ’the worlds countenanced by modal necessitarianism are a 
proper subset of the worlds countenanced by nomic or causal necessitarianism.’5  
 
Rather than proceed under the implicit assumption that actual laws govern 
only properties instantiated at the actual world, I will build this assumption 
directly into the view I wish to defend. According to my favoured version of 
necessitarianism, i) the actual laws are the laws of all worlds, and ii) the laws 
include a specification of which fundamental determinable properties are 
                                            
3 This example was introduced by Fine [2002]. Despite its dubious physical 
credentials, it suffices to make the general point. 
4 Schaffer (personal communication) has confirmed that in Schaffer [2005] he 
presupposed that the actual laws govern only properties instantiated at the actual 
world. This presupposition is required to make sense of various aspects of his setup, for 
example: ‘The nomic and causal necessitarian countenance all the worlds that the 
modal necessitarian countenances, plus some worlds with alien laws, provided that 
these alien laws only govern alien properties (properties distinct from the actual ones, 
and from any conjunctions or composites thereof). (Schaffer [2005] p.3.) 
5 Schaffer [2005] p.3. 
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instantiated6. In line with Schaffer’s original terminological intentions, I will 
continue to use the term ‘modal necessitarianism’ to refer to this package deal7. 
 
I will appeal to one additional premise in my defence of modal 
necessitarianism. It is the premise that quantum indeterminism is a part of the 
actual laws of nature; that is, that the actual laws are indeterministic in roughly 
the sort of way indicated by quantum mechanics. This assumption, while obviously 
not in any familiar sense a priori, seems very likely to be true; and it is not in 
tension with modal necessitarianism. Schaffer is unwilling to grant this premise: he 
considers the deterministic Bohmian mechanics to be an ‘empirically open 
possibility’8. I agree that the case for quantum indeterminism is not totally 
conclusive, and that the appearance of indeterminism could arise from a 
deterministic Bohmian conspiracy; but I do think that the case for quantum 
indeterminism is very strong. I am accordingly happy to make my conclusions 
conditional on this premise.  (It should, however, be noted that I only use this 
premise in the course of responding to one of the arguments offered by Schaffer – 
his ‘argument from counterfactuals’. My other responses do not rely on 
indeterminism.) 
 
So, on to the arguments. 
3 Motivating Modal Necessitarianism 
Schaffer first seeks to undermine two arguments for necessitarianism: the 
‘argument from natural necessity’ and the ‘argument from sustaining 
counterfactuals’. He correctly notes that – if valid – these arguments would count 
in favour only of modal necessitarianism, the version of necessitarianism I seek to 
defend. 
 
                                            
6 Fine [2002] likewise advocates building a specification of the fundamental 
determinable properties instantiated at any world w into the laws of nature of w. A 
referee points out that this assumption entails that it cannot be a chancy matter 
whether some particular fundamental determinable is instantiated. This consequence is 
interesting, but it doesn’t strike me as terribly problematic. 
7 Few philosophers have expressed sympathy in print with this package of views. The 
most prominent example is Alexander Bird, who expresses cautious support for it under 
the label of ‘strong necessitarianism’ (Bird [2004], [2007]). 
8  Schaffer [2005] p.8. 
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I don’t think the modal necessitarian should put much weight on the 
arguments Schaffer adduces. While there may be better arguments in their vicinity, 
as Schaffer formulates them they are unconvincing. And many necessitarians are in 
any case suspicious of a priori arguments for necessitarianism9. There might 
therefore seem little point in discussing Schaffer’s arguments for modal 
necessitarianism. Nonetheless, I think they will help us get a clearer sense of the 
nature of the dialectic between modal necessitarianism and contingentism, so I will 
briefly outline them. 
The argument from natural necessity 
(1) If the relation between properties and their powers is contingent, then 
like charges might not repel; 
(2) Like charges must repel; 
(3) Therefore: the relation between properties and their powers is not 
contingent. 
 
Schaffer diagnoses this argument as equivocating on the modal strengths of 
the ‘might not’ and the ‘must’ which appear in premises 1 and 2 respectively. He 
claims that ‘the “must” of natural necessity in (2) is a restricted necessity, and the 
“might” in (1) is unrestricted. Hence they are compatible.’10 This objection initially 
seems successful. The response of the modal necessitarian will obviously be to deny 
that the ‘must’ in (2) is restricted; but that is too close to what is at issue in the 
debate over the modal status of laws of nature, so its denial is dialectically 
unavailable for use in a suasive argument against contingentism. (In other words, it 
would beg the question.) 
 
In order to shore up the argument from natural necessity, modal 
necessitarians must independently motivate their claim that the ‘must’ in (2) is 
unrestricted. One promising strategy is to point out that the appeal to restricted 
necessity raises a new explanatory demand with a non-obvious answer: if it is 
unrestrictedly possible for like charges to repel, why should it matter to us whether 
it is impossible in some restricted sense? This line of argument has been pressed by 
Kit Fine (Fine [2002]) and by Alexander Bird (Bird [2007]), who protest that any 
number of distinct restricted necessities can be pressed into service. Why should we 
                                            
9 My own view is that the best argument for modal necessitarianism is based on the 
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. (See Wilson [2011].) More 
commonly, necessitarians have attempted to support their view by arguing that it best 
makes sense of certain features of scientific practice. 
10 Schaffer [2005] p.7. 
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be interested in a form of necessity restricted to worlds which share the actual laws 
(natural necessity), any more than we are interested in a form of necessity 
restricted to worlds which contain wombats (wombat-necessity)? And doesn’t the 
restriction strategy render the natural necessity of the laws themselves a ‘cheap and 
trivial’ matter of self-entailment11? 
 
In the face of such arguments, contingentists typically pass on the 
explanatory burden by assimilating it to the project of explaining why the laws of 
nature matter to us. Insofar as the laws of nature matter more to us than does the 
existence of wombats, it is unsurprising that we should be more interested in a 
restricted necessity that corresponds to natural necessity than we are in a restricted 
necessity that corresponds to wombat-necessity. Even if like charges might not 
repel, unrestrictedly speaking, learning that they repel in all the worlds which share 
our laws is interesting and informative just if a restriction to worlds which share 
our laws is an interesting and relevant restriction. 
 
I am unhappy with this buck-passing response. Contingentists, it seems to 
me, have not adequately addressed the challenge of explaining why laws of nature 
matter to us. At most, they have tended to gesture at arguments of this sort: 
 
“On the working hypothesis that the laws of a world are the 
generalizations that fit into the best deductive systems true there, we can 
also say that the laws are generalizations which (given suitable 
companions) are highly informative about that world in a simple way. 
Such generalizations are important to us. It makes a big difference to the 
character of a world which generalizations enjoy the status of lawhood 
there. Therefore similarity and difference of worlds in respect of their 
laws is an important respect of similarity and difference...” 
Lewis 1973 p.74-75. 
 
For Lewis, this is uncharacteristically vague; and, to my knowledge, he 
nowhere attempts to be more precise. Can contingentists do any better? Perhaps12. 
But it seems unlikely that any contingentist explanation of why the laws matter 
could improve on the necessitarian explanation, which is striking in its elegance 
and simplicity. 
                                            
11 Fine [2002]. 
12 Sophisticated frequentist attempts like those of Howson and Urbach [1993], Hoefer 
[2007] and Schwarz [forthcoming] to prove versions of Lewis’ Principal Principle may 
help the contingentist make progress in this direction, linking chancy laws to subjective 
expectations about particular events via the chances that the laws assign to those 
events. See Strevens [1999] and Handfield [2012] ch.7 for sceptical views of this project. 
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According to the modal necessitarian, laws of nature matter to us because 
they are true at all possible worlds. Open natural possibilities really could happen: 
they are genuine possibilities, not merely epistemic possibilities. In contrast, 
histories violating the laws of nature are not genuine possibilities and can be safely 
ignored. Put another way, the epistemic norm ‘assign credence zero to genuine 
impossibilities’ seems to explain the relevance of physical necessity in the context of 
modal necessitarianism, while being explanatorily impotent in the context of 
contingentism13. 
 
 Contingentists face a substantial challenge in explaining why physical 
necessity matters to us, while necessitarians have an attractive and simple 
explanation available. (An alternative way to put this point is that reading the 
‘must’ in premise (2) as a restricted necessity generates an additional explanatory 
demand, a demand which simply does not arise for the modal necessitarian.) I 
conclude, following Bird [2004], that modal necessitarianism has a significant 
explanatory advantage over contingentism. 
 
These explanatory considerations tell against the contingentist treatment 
of natural necessity as a restricted necessity. And if the best semantics for 
assertions like (2) does not involve a restricted modality, then there is no 
equivocation between (1) and (2), and the argument from natural necessity stands. 
The argument from sustaining counterfactuals 
(4) If the relation between properties and their powers is contingent, then 
there is nothing that guarantees that like charges repel in any other 
possible world; 
(5) In the nearest possible world, like charges repel; 
(6) Therefore: the relation between properties and their powers is not 
contingent. 
 
                                            
13 Of course, the non-modal norm ‘assign credence zero to falsehoods’ subsumes the 
modal norm ‘assign credence zero to genuine impossibilities’. But it seems like the 
modal norm is in some real sense easier for us to follow than the non-modal norm, and 
is thus more explanatory of our epistemic practices. By comparison, ‘apportion your 
beliefs to the evidence’ is an easier norm to follow than ‘believe all and only the truths’; 
and thus the former is more explanatory of our epistemic practices than the latter, 
despite the capacity of the former to produce false beliefs even when followed correctly. 
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Schaffer’s response to the argument from sustaining counterfactuals is to 
deny that the consequent of (4) is inconsistent with (5). He contends that even if 
charges repel in some possible worlds, there can be a guarantee that charges repel 
in the nearest possible world if fixity of laws is partly constitutive of nearness, as is 
the case according to the influential set of criteria for nearness of worlds set out by 
Lewis (Lewis [1979]). 
 
This response of Schaffer’s is closely related to his appeal to restricted 
modality in responding to the argument from natural necessity. Now the relevant 
restriction is being applied indirectly (and defeasibly) through the Lewisian criteria 
for nearness. And just as the restriction strategy for natural necessity raises a new 
explanatory demand – that of explaining why we should be interested in the 
restriction imposed by the laws of nature – so the use of a nearness relation which 
incorporates fixity of laws raises a new explanatory demand – that of explaining 
why we should be interested in a counterfactual construction incorporating a 
nearness relation restricted in this way. After all, a whole variety of nearness 
relations can be combined with the Lewisian possible-worlds framework for 
counterfactuals. The conception of nearness which incorporates fixity of laws seems 
to get the right results when it comes to matching our intuitive judgements; but we 
are left with no explanation of why it gets the right results, and with no 
explanation of why such a conception of nearness should be embedded so deeply 
into our practices of reasoning about potentially-non-actual situations. 
 
Lewis simply assimilated the question of why the counterfactual 
construction incorporating his particular nearness relation should be of interest to 
us to the question of why laws should be of interest to us. And as I argued above, 
modal necessitarians seem to have a significant advantage over contingentists on 
this point. Accordingly, the modal necessitarian has an extremely simple 
explanation of why the counterfactually nearest worlds tend to have the same laws 
as the actual world; it is that all worlds have the same laws as the actual world. It 
is hard to imagine a contingentist explanation which could match this in simplicity. 
 
One key idea can be extracted from the two arguments for necessitarianism 
that Schaffer discusses. It is that positing possible worlds with laws other than the 
actual laws generates an obligation to explain why we do not and should not take 
any account of these worlds in our deliberations. The necessitarian can appeal to 
the simple and general epistemic norm ‘assign credence zero to genuine 
impossibilities’ in explaining why in our modal and counterfactual deliberations we 
tend to hold the actual laws fixed. The contingentist must give a more complex 
story, and it remains to be seen whether any such story is forthcoming. 
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4 Defending Modal Necessitarianism 
Taking himself to have undermined the main motivations for 
necessitarianism, Schaffer moves on to providing direct arguments against 
necessitarianism. He offers five: from modality, from counterfactuals, from 
propositions, from conceivability, and from recombination. There is a common form 
to these arguments: in each case, Schaffer argues that the best philosophical theory 
of the topic in question relies essentially on contingentism. There is also a common 
form to my replies: in each case, I will argue that the contingentist theory that 
Schaffer offers is not clearly superior to the modal necessitarian alternative. 
The argument from modality 
The contingentist analyses natural necessity as a restricted form of 
necessity. According to Schaffer, only this theory ‘can assimilate natural necessity 
to the general pattern of restricted necessities found across the historical, epistemic, 
deontic and conventional necessities.’ (Schaffer [2005] p.8.) 
 
The necessitarian response to this argument should be to embrace the 
conclusion. It is not at all clear that natural necessity should be assimilated to this 
general pattern14. There are obvious differences between natural necessity and the 
restricted forms of necessity that Schaffer mentions. Most obviously, there is the 
intimate connection between natural necessity and counterfactual truth. And there 
is independent reason, as I have argued above, to think that the conception of 
natural necessity as a restricted necessity is problematic. 
 
The modal necessitarian picture can still accommodate restricted 
modalities such as historical modality, of course: the restrictions are simply placed 
onto a space of possible worlds which includes only worlds in which the actual laws 
hold. If some restricted modality serves interesting theoretical purposes when 
applied to an unrestricted contingentist space of possible worlds, then it ought to 
serve the same sort of theoretical purposes when applied to the modal necessitarian 
space of possible worlds. 
 
This is not to say that the various restricted modalities will serve these 
purposes as successfully in the context of necessitarianism as they do in the context 
of contingentism. The move from treating each restricted modality as a restriction 
                                            
14  Note that the analysis of epistemic modality as restricted is by no means 
universally accepted. A consequence of the analysis is that all metaphysically necessary 
truths are epistemically necessary; but we certainly lack knowledge of many of the 
metaphysically necessary truths of mathematics and of logic. 
10 
 
on the contingentist space of possible worlds to treating it as a restriction on the 
modal necessitarian space of possible worlds involves dropping some worlds. 
Contingentists will naturally protest that these dropped worlds – worlds which are 
compatible with the restriction but which have alien laws – can often serve 
important theoretical purposes. For example, these alien worlds might be needed to 
ground ‘counter-legal’ counterfactuals, or to provide content to propositions 
inconsistent with the actual laws. These objections are treated separately by 
Schaffer, and they are the topic of the next two subsections. If they are successful, 
that is bad news for modal necessitarianism; but then the argument from modality 
itself is doing none of the damage. 
 
I conclude that the strategy which analyses natural necessity as a 
restriction of metaphysical necessity is not clearly superior to modal 
necessitarianism, which simply identifies natural necessity with metaphysical 
necessity.  
The argument from counterfactuals 
Schaffer argues that the best account of counterfactuals requires that we 
recognise possible worlds containing miracles: small violations of the actual laws. 
Miracles of this sort are selected for by the criteria for nearness of possible worlds 
set out in Lewis [1979]; they allow the closest antecedent worlds to match the 
actual world exactly up to some time, and then to smoothly diverge in such a way 
as to make the antecedent true. Without worlds containing miracles, if the laws are 
deterministic then the closest worlds in which an antecedent which contradicts 
actuality holds will be worlds in which the initial state of the universe is different15. 
                                            
15 It is not clear why this amounts to a serious problem. Although counterfactuals like 
‘had I scratched my nose just now, the initial state of the universe would have been 
different’ seem false, so do counterfactuals like ‘had I scratched my nose just now, a 
small miracle would have occurred’. We might further suspect that part of the 
resistance to the former counterfactual derives from the feeling that it incorrectly 
indicates that my nose-scratching caused the initial state to be different. If we cancel 
this implication by use of the form ‘had I scratched my nose just now, the initial state 
of the universe would have had to have been different’, the result no longer seems 
obviously false (especially if we are explicitly attending to the possibility of 
determinism). In contrast, ‘had I scratched my nose just now, a small miracle would 
have had to have occurred’ still seems false. So an alternative possible route for modal 
necessitarians is to accept unlimited back-tracking; this allows modal necessitarianism 
to be reconciled with deterministic laws without giving up on widespread counterfactual 
truth. See Wilson, J. [forthcoming] for further discussion. 
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Miracles, by reducing the amount of ‘back-tracking’ required to make true the 
antecedent, allow determinism and our intuitive judgments about counterfactuals 
to co-exist. With miracles on board, determinism does not ensure that had I 
scratched my nose just now the state of the universe at the big bang would have 
been different. 
 
I agree that this argument spells trouble for the modal necessitarian who 
wants to reconcile the thesis that the actual laws are deterministic with the denial 
that, were things to differ from actuality in any way, the initial state of the 
universe would have been different. But this is not an attractive position for a 
modal necessitarian to adopt. Rather, the best form of modal necessitarianism will 
involve the claim that the actual laws involve quantum indeterminism, and hence 
that the laws of all possible worlds are indeterministic. 
 
The assumption that the laws are necessarily indeterministic allows the 
modal necessitarian to account for counterfactuals without appealing to worlds 
involving violations of law. There are two ways in which this can be done. Either 
the modal necessitarian can replace miracles with highly unlikely but still lawful 
’quasi-miraculous’ quantum fluctuations, and preserve the rest of the Lewisian 
semantics for counterfactuals unchanged16; or the modal necessitarian can adopt an 
alternative semantics which makes more thoroughgoing use of indeterminism, and 
which does not appeal to miracles or quasi-miracles at all. One promising proposal 
of this latter sort is offered by Maudlin [2007]; but there are many ways in which 
such theories can be developed17. But, more conservatively, the modal necessitarian 
can resist the argument from counterfactuals simply by adopting the modified 
Lewisian semantics which replaces miracles by quantum quasi-miracles. 
 
                                            
16 Might there turn out to be too few low-chance quantum-mechanical events to play 
the role of miracles in the Lewisian semantics? While this is perhaps an open empirical 
question – if something like Robin Hanson’s ‘mangled worlds’ hypothesis (Hanson 
[2003]) turns out to be correct, there may be no quantum possibilities involving 
extremely unlikely events – I think the evidence is pretty strong that quantum 
mechanics will allow for analogues of the kind of ‘small miracles’, localized in time and 
space, which are needed for the Lewisian counterfactual semantics. 
17 An advantage of this approach is that it does not render true counterfactuals like ‘if 
I had scratched my nose just now, a highly unlikely quantum event would have had 
occurred’. Other motivations for the approach might include the worries raised by 
Hawthorne [2005] and Hajek [MS] about the interaction of the Lewisian theory of 
counterfactuals with indeterministic laws. Some potential responses are canvassed by 
Williams [2008]. But we can set these worries aside here, since they apply to 
contingentism as much as to modal necessitarianism. 
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Of course, relying on quantum indeterminism to account for 
counterfactuals makes modal necessitarianism hostage to empirical fortune. But I 
am happy to accept the risk that future developments will reveal that the world is 
deterministic, since I take that outcome to be extremely unlikely.  
 
A natural concern about these modal necessitarian treatments of 
counterfactuals is that they will be unable to handle ‘counter-legal’ counterfactuals, 
those in which the antecedent is inconsistent with the actual laws of nature. But 
this limitation derives from an inherent limitation of possible-worlds semantics for 
counterfactuals. Like it or not, everyone is stuck with a large class of ‘counter-
possible’ counterfactuals which cannot be given non-trivial truth-conditions in 
possible-worlds terms: those with antecedents which are logically impossible or 
conceptually impossible, or which are inconsistent with Kripkean a posteriori 
necessities. The modal necessitarian adds some more counterfactuals to this class; 
but a separate treatment of counter-possibles (perhaps a pragmatic one, if they are 
to be counted as trivially true) is anyway essential to a possible-worlds 
counterfactual semantics. 
 
One common source of discomfort with this necessitarian response has been 
the thought that discovering whether determinism is true or false at the actual 
world shouldn’t make any difference to the correct semantics for counterfactuals. If 
we were to discover that the actual laws were deterministic, so the argument runs, 
then we would need to adopt a semantics for counterfactuals which allows for non-
trivial truth-conditions in a world with deterministic laws18.  
 
This argument fails because it makes essential use of a counterfactual 
conditional which is, according to the necessitarian, a counter-possible conditional. 
If modal necessitarianism is true and the laws of the actual world are 
indeterministic, then the discovery that determinism holds is itself an impossible 
one. 
 
Stated using indicative conditionals, the argument is uncompelling. If the 
actual laws are deterministic, then indeed the best semantics for counterfactuals 
will not rely on indeterminism. But the truth of this indicative conditional is quite 
consistent with the claim that deterministic laws are metaphysically impossible. To 
generate a difficulty for modal necessitarianism we would need the subjunctive 
                                            
18 A variant of this argument assumes that we can know that certain counterfactuals 
have non-trivial truth-conditions even in advance of knowing whether the actual laws 
are indeterministic, and concludes that non-trivial truth-conditions for counterfactuals 
must be recoverable under determinism. 
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form of the conditional; but the modal necessitarian can coherently regard this 
form as a counter-possible counterfactual, neutralizing the threat it poses. 
 
Another way to make this point is to draw an analogy with the following 
argument: if there were no possible worlds, then the best semantics for 
counterfactuals would not be a possible-worlds semantics. Since possible worlds 
may turn out not to exist, we should reject possible-worlds semantics for 
counterfactuals. Nobody will be willing to accept this argument. When the 
argument is posed in subjunctive form, the friend of possible-worlds semantics 
should think of it as a counter-possible counterfactual. And when posed in 
indicative form, it is no threat to the internal consistency of possible-worlds 
semantics. (This is essentially the response of Handfield [2004] to the argument 
against necessitarianism from counter-legals.) 
 
This discussion underlines the need for users of the possible-worlds 
semantics for counterfactuals to make a clear distinction between subjunctive and 
indicative readings of conditionals19. Given modal necessitarianism, if we are unsure 
whether some conditional is a counter-possible, then we will be unsure whether it 
has a subjunctive reading with non-trivial truth-conditions. But this is an 
unavoidable feature of the possible-worlds semantics for subjunctive conditionals. 
According to possible-worlds semantics, subjunctives are to indicatives as objective 
chances are to subjective credences, and as metaphysical possibility is to epistemic 
possibility. Ascribing falsity to a counter-possible subjunctive conditional is like 
ascribing a non-trivial objective chance to a mathematical proposition: it betrays a 
misunderstanding of the modal status of the subject-matter. But, as I have 
emphasized, this feature of the possible-worlds semantics is quite independent of 
modal necessitarianism. 
 
The thought that violations of law are not needed for the best account of 
counterfactuals is an unfamiliar one. That is because work on counterfactuals tends 
to take for granted that deterministic laws are a metaphysical possibility, and that 
we must accordingly allow for the truth of ordinary counterfactual judgements to 
be recoverable in deterministic worlds. That is, work on counterfactuals tends to 
presuppose contingentism. But this does not amount to any kind of argument. 
 
If modal necessitarianism is correct, then the best semantics for 
counterfactuals will not involve worlds containing genuine miracles. But if the 
actual laws are quantum-indeterministic, then a semantics for counterfactuals 
                                            
19 The use of these terms is philosophically standard, but grammatically incorrect. See 
Bennett [2003], Section 5. 
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which appeals to quantum indeterminism can mimic (or replace) the Lewisian 
semantics involving genuine miracles. Schaffer’s argument from counterfactuals 
accordingly has no force against the modal necessitarian who accepts quantum 
indeterminism. 
The argument from propositions 
Schaffer’s argument from propositions is straightforward. He assumes that 
propositions can be identified as sets of worlds, and that there are contentful 
propositions describing the violation of laws of nature. An example which is 
intended to underwrite this latter assumption is that ‘a misinformed scientist might 
believe that like charges attract’20. 
 
Here is the way that Schaffer formalizes the argument: 
 
(7) If the relation between properties and their powers is necessary, then 
there is no contentful proposition that like charges attract; 
(8) There is a contentful proposition that like charges attract; 
(9) Therefore: the relation between properties and their powers is not 
necessary. 
 
Schaffer suggests that the necessitarian will reject (8), and will explain 
away our attraction to it by saying that we confuse the proposition that like 
charges attract for the proposition that like schmarges schmattract. This 
explanation is not available to modal necessitarians, who deny the metaphysical 
possibility of schmarge. But modal necessitarians have other lines of response 
available to what is really a familiar dilemma. Consider an analogous argument: 
 
(7a) If the relation between numbers and number-theoretic truths is 
necessary, then there is no contentful proposition that Fermat’s Last 
Theorem is false; 
(8a) There is a contentful proposition that Fermat’s Last Theorem is false; 
(9a) Therefore: the relation between numbers and number-theoretic truths 
is not necessary. 
 
Nobody will be willing to accept the conclusion of this argument. But reasons 
for rejecting it may differ. 
 
                                            
20 Schaffer [2005] p.9. 
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Some philosophers will say that there is indeed a contentful proposition 
that that Fermat’s Last Theorem is false – it is just that this proposition is 
necessarily false. Saying this requires a theory of propositions more fine-grained 
than the propositions-are-sets-of-worlds theory. (I am assuming that the null 
proposition, true at no world, is not ‘contentful’ in Schaffer’s sense.) Such 
philosophers will reject (7a). But if (7a) is rejected then there seems to be no 
reason to uphold (7)21; and the argument from propositions fails. 
 
To give the argument from propositions any chance of success, we must 
grant Schaffer the assumption that the coarse-grained sets-of-worlds theory of 
propositions is correct. But even granting this assumption, the argument can be 
resisted by the modal necessitarian. Given the coarse-grained conception of 
propositions, the modal necessitarian will deny (8), for the same reason that 
proponents of the coarse-grained conception deny (8a). It need not always be 
obvious, even to competent speakers of a language, whether a given grammatical 
sentence expresses a contentful coarse-grained proposition. Whichever conception of 
propositions they prefer, then, the modal necessitarian can resist the argument 
from propositions. 
The argument from conceivability 
Schaffer’s argument from conceivability maintains that the link between 
conceivability and possibility is an indispensable part of modal epistemology, and 
that the modal necessitarian ‘is committed to a complete collapse of any 
conceivability-possibility link’22. He formulates the argument from conceivability as 
follows: 
 
(10) If the relation between properties and their powers is necessary, then 
it is inconceivable that like charges attract; 
(11) It is conceivable that like charges attract; 
(12) Therefore: the relation between properties and their powers is not 
necessary. 
 
Schaffer expects the necessitarian to respond by saying that that (11) is 
false, and that when we take ourselves to be conceiving that like charges attract, 
we are in fact conceiving that like schmarges schmattract. He correctly maintains 
                                            
21 Perhaps like charges attracting is conceivable while mathematical falsehoods aren’t. 
But to press this point is to change the subject from the argument from propositions to 
the argument from conceivability, discussed in the next subsection. 
22  Schaffer [2005] p.12. 
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that this response is not available to the modal necessitarian, but only to the causal 
or nomic necessitarian, and quite reasonably criticizes it as lacking independent 
motivation. 
 
In contrast, modal necessitarians have a quite different response available. 
They can deny that there is any such possible property as schmarge, or any such 
possible behaviour as schmattraction, but nevertheless reject the idea that this 
requires charges attracting to be inconceivable. This response involves denying that 
conceivability entails possibility, and rejecting (10). Whether it is conceivable that 
like charges attract depends on us, and on our conceptual apparatus. Whether the 
relation between properties and their powers is necessary depends not at all on us 
or on our conceptual apparatus, but on the properties and powers themselves. (10) 
is prima facie implausible. 
 
Schaffer does in fact go on to provide additional support for (10). In a 
footnote he argues that ‘conceivability seems to be our main guide to knowledge of 
what is possible. This suggests that it is preferable to restrict conceivability rather 
than reject it outright, on pain of modal skepticism23.’ This motivation for the 
conceivability-possibility link may be persuasive to the contingentist (who faces 
notorious difficulties when it comes to modal epistemology, and who might well 
choose to embrace a problematic epistemology rather than to give up on the 
project altogether) but it is totally unpersuasive for the modal necessitarian. 
 
According to modal necessitarianism, modal epistemology is continuous 
with ordinary epistemology. While it does not itself entail many particular modal 
truths, modal necessitarianism does remove the need for a distinctive 
epistemological route to modal knowledge. Fundamental physical theories, if true, 
comprise metaphysically necessary truths according to modal necessitarianism; and 
the state space of the true fundamental physical theory faithfully represents the 
space of genuinely possible worlds. 
 
Once modal epistemology is assimilated to general scientific epistemology 
in this way, the inference from conceivability to possibility looks thoroughly 
dubious. For p to be conceivable, for a modal necessitarian, is just for p to be 
conceived in some possible world; that is, for p to be conceivable is for an event of 
conceiving-that-p to be compatible with the fundamental laws of nature of the 
actual world. There is of course no entailment from ‘p is conceived’ to ‘p is true’ – 
so why should there be any entailment from ‘p is possibly conceived’ to ‘p is 
                                            
23 Schaffer [2005], p.26. 
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possibly true’? Only a perceived lack of any alternative route to modal knowledge 
could lead us to rely on the conceivability-possibility inference. 
 
Far from presenting a problem for modal necessitarianism, the unification 
of modal epistemology with general scientific epistemology that it involves is one of 
the strongest points in its favour. Modal necessitarians require no special 
epistemology for modal truths, and they need not rely on the problematic 
conceivability-possibility link. The argument from conceivability is accordingly 
impotent against modal necessitarianism. 
The argument from recombination 
Schaffer’s final argument against necessitarianism runs as follows: 
 
(13) If the relation between properties and their powers is necessary, then 
some combinations of charge and acceleration would be impossible; 
(14) All combinations of charge and acceleration are possible; 
(15) Therefore: the relation between properties and their powers is not 
necessary. 
 
As should be obvious, the modal necessitarian will deny (14), and maintain 
that not all combinations of charge and acceleration are possible. There are two 
viable ways to underwrite this denial. 
 
The first way is to appeal to the thought that charge and acceleration are 
not ‘distinct existences’, maintaining recombination (as Schaffer states it, that if x 
and y are distinct existences, then there is a possible world with just x, a possible 
world with just y, and a possible world with x and y). Schaffer anticipates this 
necessitarian response, and argues that it ‘preserves the letter of recombination, but 
dashes its spirit.’24  The argument given for this conclusion involves the supposition 
that the laws are deterministic. For reasons discussed above, the necessitarian need 
not grant this supposition: the best form of necessitarianism has it that the laws 
are necessarily indeterministic. However, Schaffer’s rebuttal of the necessitarian 
response fails even on the assumption that the actual laws are deterministic. 
 
The rebuttal starts with the observation that ‘every actual existence is a 
correlate of a common cause: the Big Bang’ and argues that, if necessitarianism and 
determinism are true, that entails that ‘zero recombination of actual existences is 
                                            
24 Schaffer [2005], p.12. 
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allowed. The world has become an indivisible Parmenidean unity, the essential 
outpouring of the initial singularity. This is not a minor restriction on 
recombination, but rather an unprecedented rejection of any recombination of 
actual elements25.’ 
 
This argument fails because it neglects that the necessitarian may hold 
that the actual initial conditions of the universe are contingent, even if the actual 
laws are necessary. Schaffer recognises this option in a footnote, but dismisses it as 
a route to reclaiming recombination: ‘Perhaps sometimes this is possible. But, I 
suspect, it will still drastically limit recombination of actual elements, far beyond 
what intuition permits26.’ But he has not provided any argument that the 
restriction on recombination which determinism and modal necessitarianism jointly 
produce is as extensive as he suspects it is27. 
 
In the same footnote, Schaffer complains that linking recombination to the 
contingency of initial conditions renders recombination an a posteriori matter. I see 
this result as a virtue of modal necessitarianism rather than as a vice. Modal 
necessitarians will typically be unmoved by appeals to intuition about what is 
possible; their modal epistemology is a posteriori and scientific, not a priori and 
intuition-based. 
 
The second way modal necessitarians can resist the argument from 
recombination is to abandon recombination altogether, and to give an alternative 
characterization of modal space. Modal necessitarianism gives us rich resources for 
doing this; according to modal necessitarianism, the state spaces associated with 
physical theories themselves comprise naturalistic descriptions of the general 
features of the space of genuinely possible worlds. This second option is the one 
that I prefer. Just as the role that the inference from conceivability to possibility 
plays in contingentist modal epistemology is rendered superfluous by modal 
necessitarianism, so may be the role that recombination plays in contingentist 
modal metaphysics. 
 
                                            
25 Schaffer [2005], p.12. 
26 Schaffer [2005], p.27. 
27 Even if an argument of this sort can be provided, the modal necessitarian could fall 
back on the assumption that the laws are necessarily indeterministic. Wherever there 
are independent chance events, all combinations of their possible outcomes are possible: 
this undermines the thought that the world is ‘the essential outpouring of the initial 
singularity’. 
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Even for modal necessitarians who are friends of recombination, the 
argument from recombination can be rejected. And for modal necessitarians who 
reject recombination and give a naturalistic characterization of modal space, the 
argument has no force at all. 
5 Conclusion 
I have replied to Schaffer’s criticisms of two arguments for modal 
necessitarianism, and I have shown how his direct arguments against 
necessitarianism lack any force against a modal necessitarian who takes the actual 
laws to be quantum-indeterministic. In the process, I have highlighted some 
advantages of a necessitarian modal epistemology over a contingentist modal 
epistemology. I conclude that the modal status of the laws of nature remains very 
much an open question28. 
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